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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondents have disputed the applicable standard of review to
be applied to the issues in this case.

It is the parties

characterization of the issues which leads to the dispute over the
proper standard of review.
Mr. Willardson identified as the first issue whether Mr.
Willardson suffered a compensable industrial accident. That issue
was identified in Mr. Willardson's Docketing Statement as an issue
and was not objected to by Respondents; nor did Respondents
indicate that they would modify or raise other issues at that time.
In their brief, however, Respondents have for the first time
specified that the issue is really whether Mr. Willardson work
activities on April 15, 1988 were the medical cause of his
disability.

After stating that as the issue, they allege that it

is a factual issue and should be governed by the "substantial
evidence" test. That argument while correct as a matter of law is
not responsive to the applicable standard to be applied to the
issue Petitioner has raised.
The relevant issue is whether Mr. Willardson suffered a
compensable industrial injury and not the more restrictive issue of
medical causation.

The Order of the Administrative Law Judge,

adopted by the Industrial Commission, states as follow:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for
permanent total disability benefits associated with the
work activities of April 15th, 1988 is dismissed with
prejudice for failure to establish a compensable
industrial injury. (R. at 26).

1

Neither

the Administrative

Law Judge

or the

Industrial

Commission made a single Finding of Fact on the issue of medical
causation.

The Findings of Fact portion of the Order of the

Administrative Law Judge is not proper fact finding but merely an
"informative summary of the evidence presented" such as was found
to be inadequate and improper in Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d
1 (Utah App. 1991).

The only discussion of medical causation

occurs in the Conclusions of Law section of the Order. Conclusions
of Law are reviewed under the* "correction of error standard" and no
deference

need

be

given

to

the

agency's

view

of

the

law.

Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b16(4)(e) (1988).

Mor-flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d

328 (Utah 1991).

Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division

of the Utah State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
The parties agree that the second issue as to whether the
correct standard of proof was applied should also be governed by
the "correction of error standard", thus no reply is required to
Respondent's arguments thereon.
In regards to the issue of failure to convene a Medical Panel,
Respondents allege that the standard of "abuse of discretion"
should apply.

"Abuse of discretion" is not a standard of review

under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, and the cases cited
by Respondents were not based on the current standards of review
necessitated by that Act.

The issue is not whether there was an

abuse of discretion, but rather whether by reason of the Industrial
Commission's own rules and regulations, there was no discretion to
2

be exercised and whether the Industrial Commission acted unlawfully
in not convening a Medical Panel.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1) (a) (1988) is the
determinative statute in this case. Rule 568-1-9 of the Industrial
Commissions administrative rules is also applicable. They are set
forth in full in the Addendum hereto as Exhibits A and B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties do not truly dispute the relevant and applicable
facts in this matter. Despite the fact that Respondents allege Mr.
Willardson has failed to marshall the evidence in support in the
Findings of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission, there is not a single significant relevant fact cited
and referred to in Respondent's Brief that does not also appear in
Mr. Willardson's Statement of Facts.
Any failure to completely marshall the evidence in support of
the Order is due to the inadequate Findings as argued both above
and in Mr. Willardson's original Brief.

Indeed, Mr. Willardson's

Brief contains statements of pre-existing and subsequent injuries
to which even the Respondents have not referred.

The only true

difference between the Statement of Facts contained in the two
Briefs is of style and tone; Mr. Willardson has set out the facts
fully

and

without

commentary, while

argumentative and biased.
3

Respondent's

version

is

While Mr. Willardson is reluctant to reiterate the facts at
this stage, it is important to keep in mind that the following are
the relevant, essential and undisputed facts:
1.

Mr. Willardson undeniably had a history of prior back

injuries including a lumbar laminectomy in 1971 (R. at 20) , a
diagnosis of osteopathic and degenerative disk disease of the
lumbar spine in July of 1993 (R. A-7 at 73) , and a fall at home
from a ladder in June of 1988 (R. at A-8 at 169).
2.

Mr. Willardson suffered an industrial injury on or about

April 15, 1988, while in the employ of Respondent Beaver Creek Coal
Company. (R. at 8).
3. Mr. Willardson was never able to return to work and it is
conceded
disabled.
4.

by all parties that he

is permanently

and totally

(R. at 10, 74).
The United States Social Security Administration also

found him to be totally disabled and awarded him total disability
benefits beginning April 15, 1988, the date of his industrial
accident. (R. A-12).
5.

Dr. C. Kotrady in his Physician's Initial Report of Work

Injury indicated that Mr. Willardson's condition was the result of
his industrial injury, while also noting the existence of preexisting disk disease. (R. at A-2 at 11.5).

Dr. Kotrady saw Mr.

Willardson on two occasions, and his medical records comprise a
mere six pages, two of which are actually his wife's records. (R.
at A-2 at 6-12).
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6.

Dr. Kotrady never released Mr. Willardson to return to

work (despite his initial impression that he would be able to
return in ten days), and has never directly stated or even implied
that Mr. Willardson's current total disability condition is not at
least partially related to his industrial accident.

Dr. Kotrady

last saw Mr. Willardson on April 19, 1988 (R. A-2 at 8) (only four
days after the industrial accident), and some three years prior to
the Hearing before the Administrative Law Judge!
7.

Mr. Willardson was treated by Drs. Heiner and Gaufin over

a two year period between April 1988 and February 1990.
seen approximately every month or two.

He was

The medical records of

those two doctors cover the last two years of Mr. Willardson's
medical history and comprise some 2 6 pages.
Neurologist,

specifically

found

degenerative

Dr.
disk

Gaufin, a
and

joint

disease, but stressed that the lumbar radiculopathy was secondary
to the work related injury of April 15, 1988 (R. A-6 at 58-59).
8.

Dr. Kotrady never issued a direct opinion as to the

relationship between disability sustained by Mr. Willardson and the
industrial accident.

Dr. Heiner gave him a 30% whole person

rating, with 50% of that being due to the industrial accident (R.
A-4 at 42-46) . Dr. Gaufin gave a 15% whole person rating, with 50%
due to the industrial accident. (R. A-6 at 60).
9. The Respondents did not have Mr. Willardson examined by a
physician of their own choosing; nor did they present any contrary
medical evidence at the hearing. The Administrative Law Judge did
not refer Mr. Willardson to a Medical Panel.
5

While

the

Respondents

attempt

to

cast

doubt

on

Mr.

Willardson's testimony about his injuries resulting from "screen
jerking," that argument is not relevant to the resolution of his
claim.

Even if the accident occurred as the Administrative Law

Judge states as "the result of lifting twenty-twenty five pound
wire mesh screens and lifting them to a belt, a procedure involving
climbing, stretching, reaching and twisting motions", (R. at 25),
it would still be compensable. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).

Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Commission, 766

P.2d 1089 (Utah App. 1988).

SUMMARY OF REPLY
Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

35-1-77

(1988)

gives

the

Industrial Commission discretion in determining which cases are to
be referred to Medical Panels. The Industrial Commission pursuant
to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated,
Section 63-46B-16, et. seq., (1988) adopted rules and regulations
governing the exercise of that discretion.

R568-1-9 removes the

Industrial Commissions general discretion and specifies the terms
and conditions in which a Medical Panel "will be utilized".
The Industrial Commission is bound by it's own formally
promulgated rules and regulations, and does not have the discretion
to ignore them or to modify them without engaging in formal rule making procedures. This case involves "conflicting medical reports
of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person". Under such facts, a Medical Panel must be used and
6

this case should be remanded back to the Industrial Commission for
the purpose of convening a Medical Panel•
The issue as to whether a compensable industrial injury
occurred turns on the question of medical causation. The existing
Orders

by

the

Administrative

Law

Judge

and

the

Industrial

Commission are deficient in that they fail to engage in adequate
fact finding.

Such failure prevents Mr. Willardson from fully

marshalling all the evidence in support of the Order, and showing
that they are insufficient and inadequate.

There is, however,

substantial evidence of permanent, partial impairment as the result
of an industrial injury. To the extent that there is any doubt as
to medical causation and whether a compensable injury has occurred,
that issue can only be adequately and fairly resolved after a
Medical Panel has been convened and makes its report. This matter
should be remanded for review by a Medical Panel.

A R G U M E N T

I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL.

IN

NOT

Although Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1) (a) (1988)
makes the referral of medical aspects of a case to a Medical Panel
discretionary

with

the

Industrial

Commission, the

Industrial

Commission has utilized that discretion in enacting rules and
regulations specifying the standards for when a Medical Panel will
be convened.

Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 governing the
7

"Necessity of submitting a case to a Medical Panel" provides in
relevant part, as follows:
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, UCA, the Industrial
Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law
Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) .
Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person,
(b).
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cut-off date which vary more than 90
days, and/or,
(c) . Medical expenses and controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.00... (emphasis added). See Addendum,
Exhibit A.
Respondents argue that referral to a Medical Panel is not
required

because

causation.

there was

no

credible

evidence

of medical

While conceding that Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner's

reports establish conflicting medical reports which vary by more
than 5%, they dismissed those reports as not being "credible."
They allege lack of credibility on the basis that the reports were
only "fill in the blank forms", that the Doctors did not have
access to all of Mr. Willardson's medical records, and that their
reports do not specifically state that the ratings are based on the
AMA Guidelines.

That argument is fallacious.

Indeed, it must be remembered that there is no evidence that
Dr. Heiner or Dr. Gaufin did not have
8

- or even needed - all of

Mr, Willardson's records or that their reports were not based upon
the AMA Guidelines. Significantly, they were both Mr. Willardson's
treating physicians.

Although their disability ratings appear on

a short form, they are based upon substantial medical reports
compiled over a two (2) year period.
The rule does not require that there be conflicting credible
reports, that the Doctors have all of the medical records or even
that the medical reports be based upon the AMA Guidelines. All the
Rule requires is that there be "conflicting medical reports of
permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person."
In effect, Respondents are attempting to amend, outside of
formal rule making procedures, the Industrial Commission7s rules to
provide that Medical Panel referral is only required when the
Administrative Law Judge finds the reports credible and based on
all the evidence in the case, as well as based upon the AMA
Guidelines.

The Rule, however, does not so require.

If such was

required, one wonders why a Medical Panel would even be required
since the existing reports would be virtually conclusive. The rule
flatly

provides

that a panel

"will be used when there are

conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which
vary by more than 5% of the whole person."
Although

the statute makes referral to a Medical Panel

discretionary,

the

discretion

make

to

Industrial

Commission

it mandatory

9

should

Rule
the

exercises that
requirements

in

subsections (a) \ (b) or (c) of the Rule be met.

In response to

this argument Respondents make three points:
1. Legislative intent. Respondents argue that the Industrial
Commission cannot adopt a mandatory rule when the legislature
provided that referral would be discretionary.

It is clear that

given a grant of discretion, an administrative agency can adopt
rules and regulations governing the application of the discretion.
Indeed, the failure to do so itself may be an abuse of discretion.
Were this not so, the Industrial Commission would be constantly
subject to claims of "abuse of discretion" since it would have no
standards to guide it in its; exercise of discretion.

There is no

conflict between the legislature's grant of discretionary authority
to the Industrial Commission, and the Industrial Commission's rule
that it will exercise that discretion by making referrals mandatory
under

specific circumstances.

Such rule-making

is a proper

utilization of the Industrial Commission's discretionary authority.
2. Exceeding the scope of legislative authority. Respondents
also argue that the Industrial Commission Rule, providing for
mandatory referral in certain circumstances exceeds the scope of
the discretionary authority granted by statute.

Respondents are

essentially remaking the same point they argued above.

They cite

no authority on point for this position. A regulation which makes
referral to a Medical Panel mandatory under certain circumstances
is consistent with the discretionary authority to make those
referrals granted by the statute.

10

The regulation is not void for

the mere reason that it specifies the terms and conditions under
which the grant of discretion will be exercised.
3. The Administrative Law Judge can disregard the finding of
the Medical Panel. Mr. Willardson does not dispute the fact that
the Medical Panel report is not conclusive on the issue of medical
causation. The Administrative Law Judge, and indeed the Industrial
Commission itself, may, after viewing the evidence as a whole,
including the report of the Medical Panel, make the decision that
other evidence in the case outweighs the findings and conclusions
of a Medical Panel.

Respondent's argument, however, does not at

all address whether a Medical Panel report must in the first
instance be received and considered.
The Respondent's argument that administrative agencies' rules
are mere "guidelines" which can be disregarded at will has already
been considered and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In State,
by and through Department of Community Affairs v. Utah Merit System
Council, 614 P. 2d 1259, the Supreme Court stated as follows:
The Council cannot violate its own procedure rules....
Defendants contend that procedure rules are mere
'guidelines', but administrative regulations are presumed
to be reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or
followed by the agency to suit its own purpose. Such is
the essence of arbitrary and capricious action. Without
compelling reasons for not following its own rules, an
agency must be held to them, (citations omitted) Id. at
1263.
That holding is well grounded and finds authority in virtually
all other jurisdictions. An administrative agency may not violate
or ignore its own rules, and where it fails to follow the rules
which it has promulgated, its orders are unlawful. Clay v. Arizona
11

Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc., 779 P.2d 349 (Arizona 1989),

Tew v.

City of Topeka Police and Fire Civil Service Commission, 696 P.2d
1279 (Kansas 1985). State Ex Rel. Nevada Tax Commission v. Safeway
Super Service Stations, I n c . 668 P.2d 291 (Nevada 1983). U. S. v.
RCA Alaska Communications Inc., 597 P.2d 489 (Alaska 1979).
Should there be any conflict between a statutory grant of
authority and an Administrative rule, the rule controls where the
matter at issue is merely "procedural" as distinguished from being
"substantive."
1984).

State v. Hawkins, 680 P.2d 522, 523 (Arizona App.

Clearly, referral of a Workers Compensation case to a

Medical Panel is not a substantive matter but a procedural one. As
Respondents have pointed out, the Medical Panel report is merely
additional evidence which must be weighed with the record as a
whole and may be disregarded by the fact finder, if a proper basis
exists for it.

In such cases, the Administrative Rule controls

over the statutory enactment.
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related
injury and Mr. Willardson's permanent total disability, if not
clear, was at least uncertain.

Failure to refer the matter to a

Medical Panel was, therefore, error. The Order Denying the Motion
for Review should at least be reversed and the matter remanded with
directions to refer the matter to a Medical Panel, since failure to
do so was in direct conflict with the Industrial Commission's Rule.
The failure to obtain a Medical Panel opinion resulted in the
Administrative

Law

Judge

lacking

essential

information to adjudicate Mr. Willardson's claim.
12

and

necessary

II
PETITIONER SUSTAINED AN INJURY BY REASON OF AN INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
(a) Petitioner has marshalled the evidence indicating
that it is insufficient to support the Order of the
Industrial Commission.
As stated above, Mr. Willardson has referenced all of the
medical evidence which allegedly supports the findings of the
Administrative Law Judge, and that evidence is overwhelmingly
insufficient to support the Order entered.

Mr. Willardson has

admitted that he has a "history of prior back injuries and has been
undeniably suffering from moderate to severe arthritic changes in
his lumbar spine and pelvis." (R. at 36).

He painstakingly

recounted and referenced his prior medical history.

The findings

of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission,
however, are based solely on the scant medical records of Dr.
Kotrady.

The four pages of medical records which relate to Mr.

Willardson cover only two visits over a four day period.

The

records and findings of Dr.'s Gaufin and Heiner on the other hand
encompass two years of regular physical examination and treatment.
Respondents are unable to indicate any specific evidence which Mr.
Willardson should have but failed to marshall in support of the
Order below.
The Findings of Fact in this case are grossly deficient. The
Administrative Law Judge did not engage in proper fact finding;
rather, the Findings of Fact portion of the Order is merely a
summary of the evidence presented.
13

This Court has previously

stated

that

a rehearsal

of

contradictory

evidence

does not

constitute findings of fact. Adams v. Board of Review, supra. The
findings made by the Administrative Law Judge are deficient in that
they fail to address in detail the issue of medical causation. As
argued above the only discussion of medical causation occurs not in
the Findings of Fact portion of the Order but in the Conclusions of
Law portion.
The Administrative Law Judge spends a great deal of time
discussing Mr. Willardson's prior medical

problems, but does not

make precise Findings as to his current medical condition and the
causes for it.

This failure was compounded by the Industrial

Commissions unwarranted refusal to submit this matter to a Medical
Panel as complained above.
The Administrative Law Judge's purported Findings of Fact and
Conclusions

of

Law

and

Order,

as

well

as

the

Industrial

Commission's Order Denying the Motion for Review, should at a
minimum be vacated and a new Order entered with detailed and
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusions were reached.

Failure to do so denies Mr. Willardson

the ability to marshall the evidence in support of the findings and
show that it is not substantial.

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of

Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 1989).
(b) The Industrial Accident aggravated Petitioner's
pre-existing condition.
Respondents are correct that the aggravation of a pre-existing
condition

is compensable only if it is a permanent, ratable
14

aggravation. Respondent's error, however, is that Mr. Willardson's
industrial injury did in fact aggravate his pre-existing condition.
The medical records and reports of Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner make
clear that at least 50% of Mr. Willardson's present disability
status is directly and causally related to his industrial accident.
There was no medical evidence offered at the hearing which would
suggest that Mr. Willardson's injuries were not at least partially
the result of the industrial accident.
The Administrative Law Judge cannot arbitrarily discount
competent, uncontradicted evidence indicating that the industrial
injury was the cause of Mr. Willardson7s present permanent, total
disability. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 709 P. 2d
1168 (Utah 1985).

Frito-Lav, Inc. v. Jacobs. 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah

1984) .
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The

Industrial

Commission

violated

its

own

rules

and

regulations specifying that cases such as Mr. Willardson will be
submitted to a Medical Panel.

The Rule does not require that a

referral will only occur when the conflicting medical reports are
found by an Administrative Law Judge to be credible or that they
must be based upon AMA Guidelines.

Unfortunately, any failure to

find medical causation in this case was undoubtedly compounded by
the failure to refer this matter to a Medical Panel.
The Orders of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial
Commission are deficient in that they fail to engage in proper fact
finding. The Orders do not "sufficiently detail and include enough
15

subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each of the factual issues was reached,"

Adams,

supra.
It is undisputed that Mr. Willardson is presently permanently
and totally disabled, and that that condition occurred as the
result of his industrial accident.

Prior to his accident he was

gainfully employed, and following that accident he has been unable
to return to work.

He is entitled to benefits under the Utah

Workers Compensation Act.
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either
award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and medical
evidence presently in the record, or in the alternative, to convene
a Medical Panel.
DATED this 16th day of February, 1$93.

VI
Attorney
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing
Reply Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this
16th day of February, 1993 to the following:
Utah Court of Appeals
(1 original & 7 copies)
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 South 300 East
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(2 copies)

Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND
Post Office Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

(2 copies)

Steven J. Aeschbacher, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, Suite #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(2 copies)

Mr. Kerry L. Willardson
Post Office Box 209
Castle Dale, Utah 84513

(1 copy)

File

copies)
DABffEY

/\

i|

\

ft

[\.c./

& DABNEY,

1

I

jS

^^#

^V

\
JS DABNEY

Attorney for Petlitioiier
willrdsn\willbrf.rpl
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A;

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988).

EXHIBIT B;

Utah Administrative Code, Rule R568-1-9.
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants —
Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports —
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. (Last amended 1991)
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by
accident, or for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if
the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission.
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to
an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission shall,
except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical panel.
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation
of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its sole
discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time
or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and
advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding
responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or
medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and
under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may determine
to be necessary or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission may
require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from
performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of the
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occupation
al disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged/
accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, and if so,
the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so contributed.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail with
return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited in the
United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance
carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no
written objections are filed within that period, the report is considered
admitted in evidence.
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(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the
panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding,
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing,
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the
medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at the
hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause shown, the
commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the chairman
or the medical director or medical consultants, to be present at the hearing
for examination and cross-examination.
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical
consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the
testimony admitted.
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before
the commission shall be paid out of the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund, (as last
amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 1988)

R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Industrial Commission
adopts the following guidelines in determining the necessity of
submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b)
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90
days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting
to more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report.
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for
consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.
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